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A field study of altruistic behaviour is presented using a modification of the dictator game in a
large random sample survey in the Netherlands (n=1,964). In line with laboratory experiments,
only 5.7% donated money. In line with other survey research on giving, generosity increased
with age, education, income, trust, and prosocial value orientation.
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Introduction
Respondents in surveys are sometimes compensated for
participation with monetary incentives. This practice can be
used effectively to study altruistic behaviour. Because altruis-
tic behaviour is socially desirable, self-reports on altruistic be-
haviour in surveys are prone to self-presentation effects. This
paper presents a simple method to study altruistic behaviour
in a survey context, based on an experiment commonly used
in behavioural economics: the dictator game.
In economics, the dictator game (Eckel and Grossman
1996; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith 1996) has become well
known for its results violating predictions based on “rational
choice” models of human behavior with orthodox assump-
tions on self-interest (Camerer 2003). Typically, the dictator
game is played as follows. Participants receive a show-up fee
(e.g., $5 in Eckel and Grossman 1996 and Hoffman, McCabe
and Smith 1996) upon arrival at the laboratory. Then partici-
pants unexpectedly receive an endowment (usually $10), to
be used in a “decision problem”. Participants are assigned
either of two roles: of recipient or allocator. A participant in
the role of allocator can allocate her endowment to herself
or to a randomly chosen anonymous other participant (the
recipient). The allocator can allocate any desired amount
($0, $1, . . . , $10) to the recipient. Unlike other games (e.g.,
the ultimatum game), the recipient has no power to refuse
the money. When the allocation is made, the game ends.
Recipients and allocators are paid and debriefed.
When allocators are assumed to behave as rational ego-
ists, they should keep the entire endowment to themselves.
However, a substantial minority of participants in dictator
games allocates at least some portion of the endowment to
the anonymous other. According to Camerer (2003), the
proportion of participants giving away nothing at all from
their endowment varies from 0 to 93%, with an average of
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33.9%. The mean donation by participants in dictator games
in the laboratory is about 20% of the endowment (Camerer
2003).
The result that at least a sizeable minority of partici-
pants in dictator games allocates money to recipients seems
to suggest that there is some altruism in “human nature”. It
appears that some people also care about outcomes for others.
However, the methodology used in previous dictator game
experiments suffers from several problems. Previous studies
suffer from experimenter demands, often make unrealistic
assumptions on asset legitimacy, and commonly use conve-
nience samples of students as participants. These aspects of
the context in which allocation decisions are made clearly
influence the results (Harrison and List 2004). Experimenter
demands increase generosity in the dictator game. When the
experimenters are able to observe the allocation, participants
allocate significantly more to recipients than in double-blind
conditions (Eckel and Grossman 1996). When participants
do not receive a windfall endowment at the beginning of
the game but play with money they have earned themselves,
they are substantially less generous (Cherry, Frykblom and
Shogren 2002). When experiments fail to rule out other mo-
tives, contributions may not indicate altruistic concerns for
recipients.
The use of convenience samples of students also creates
a potential bias (Harrison and List 2004). In our case, this
seems likely. It is a well-established finding in research on
philanthropy that giving increases with the level of educa-
tion (Bekkers 2006; Brown 2005; Havens, O’Herlihy and
Schervish 2006; Rooney, Mesch, Chin and Steinberg 2005).
The higher educated earn higher incomes, have higher ver-
bal ability, larger social networks, and are more trusting of
others. Income, verbal ability, size of social networks and
trust are associated with higher levels of education and with
higher donations to charitable causes (Bekkers 2006; Brown
2005). University students will have higher verbal ability,
larger social networks and higher levels of trust, but a lower
income because they have not yet entered the labor market.
The stronger the effect of verbal ability, networks and trust on
charitable giving relative to the effect of income, the more the
use of university students in experiments will bias the level of
generosity upward.
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This paper presents a method to conduct field experi-
ments with charitable giving that does not suffer from the
problems in laboratory experiments and that can be used eas-
ily in household surveys. A large, representative sample of
the Dutch population (n=1,964) played an “All-or-Nothing”
version of the dictator game, after they completed an online
survey. Participants did not receive a windfall endowment,
but played with earnings obtained by participating in the sur-
vey (on average e9, $11). The money offered by dictators
benefited charities. There was no experimenter present, and
choices were made anonymously. The results come close
to the prediction of orthodox rational choice: only 5.7% of
the sample donated money. Donations increase with age,
education, income, and prosocial value orientation.
Data and Methods
The participants in this study were 1,964 respondents of
the first wave of the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Sur-
vey (GINPS), collected in May 2002 (for details on design,
sampling and questionnaires, see Schuyt 2003:225-228). Re-
spondents were drawn from a pool of 72,000 respondents
who were invited to participate in the present survey through
the Internet. Because there was no interviewer present when
the respondents completed the GINPS-questionnaire and de-
cided about donating their earnings, experimenter demands
are unlikely. The sample was representative for the Dutch
population on key characteristics such as age, gender, and
geographic region (Schuyt 2003).
By participating in the GINPS, respondents earned a re-
ward, proportional to the amount of time it took them to
complete the questionnaire. After the questionnaire was com-
pleted, respondents were given several options for payment
of their earnings: (a) in the form of vouchers, to be used
in national chains of department stores; (b) in the form of
“Air miles”; (c) in the form of a donation to one of three
charitable causes: “Me´decins Sans Frontie`res” (Doctors With-
out Borders, providing emergency health care in developing
countries), the Aids Fund (fighting HIV/Aids, mainly through
research) or the Queen Wilhelmina Fund (fighting cancer,
mainly through medical research). In contrast to the ordinary
dictator game, the participants did not have the option of
distributing the reward between themselves and the recipient.
The possibility of giving away a proportion of the reward was
not offered in order to test a procedure that is also feasible
in personal interviews. In the standard dictator game, this
option is provided, and a larger minority donates at least
something to charity. The donation decision parallels the
choice between offering either 100% or 0%. Thus, the present
experiment constitutes a natural field experiment (Harrison
and List 2004:1014) with an “All-or-Nothing” dictator game
in which charities are identified as recipients.
On average, the respondents earned e9 ($11) for spend-
ing 35 minutes filling out the questionnaire. Because the
game was completed after a questionnaire on philanthropy, it
is possible to investigate the relation of donations in the game
with self-reports on philanthropy and variables that have been
found to predict philanthropy in prior research (e.g., Bekkers
2006; Havens, O’Herlihy and Schervish 2006; Rooney,
Mesch, Chin and Steinberg 2005). Included in the present
study are the following measures of socio–demographic char-
acteristics: dummy variables for gender (female=1), age
group (40–64, 65 and over; 18–39 was the reference cate-
gory), the level of education (bachelor degree=1), whether
respondents are currently students, the natural logarithm of
gross yearly household income (midpoint values were used
of 24 categories, ranging from e2,000 to e300,000; higher
incomes were truncated), and the number of church visits per
year. Also included in the analysis are measures of gener-
alized social trust and social value orientation. Generalized
social trust is a dummy variable (above median=1) for two
statements about human nature (”You can’t be too careful in
dealing with other people” and “Most people can be trusted”,
ranging from 1 – disagree completely – to 5 – completely
agree). A dummy variable for trust is included instead of a
mean score because the effect of trust on charitable giving is
non-linear (Bekkers 2003). Social value orientation is com-
monly used in social psychology to measure the concern for
joint outcomes and equality in social dilemmas (Van Lange
1999). Social value orientation predicts self-reported dona-
tions (Bekkers 2006), as well as donations in dictator games
in laboratory experiments (Buckley et al. 2001). Our measure
for prosocial value orientation is a count of the number of
prosocial allocations of hypothetical endowments in a series
of nine single-shot “decomposed games” (Van Lange et al.
1997). Finally, the amount of money earned with survey
participation was included as a measure of the stakes in the
donation decision. Stakes varied from e6 to e11 ($7.5 to
$13.75), and were e9 ($11) on average.
I compare the correlates of observed donations in the
game with correlates of self-reported philanthropy in the past
year. If the game is a valid way to measure altruistic behavior,
it should be correlated not only with other measures of proso-
cial behavior like philanthropy, but should also be related to a
similar set of determinants. Philanthropy in the past year was
measured with a so-called “Method-Area” module (Rooney,
Steinberg and Schervish 2004). Respondents were first given
a list of 25 methods that they may have used to donate money.
Respondents indicated whether they donated any money to
charities using each of these methods. Next, they were given
a list of 9 subsectors in which charities and nonprofits are
active, and a category “other”. For each of these subsectors,
respondents indicated whether their household had donated
money to charities in those sectors, and if so, how much.
Respondents who reported at least one positive amount do-
nated to these sectors were considered as donors. Compared
to other measurement instruments, the Method-Area module
leads to higher, and more accurate estimates of the volume of
philanthropy by households (Rooney, Steinberg and Schervish
2004), mainly because it increases recall of small donations
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2006).
Correlates of donations in the game are analyzed with a
maximum likelihood probit model. Correlates of self-reported
philanthropy are analyzed with a regression model with se-
lection (”Heckman Two Stage regression”), which is a more
appropriate model than either OLS or tobit (Smith, Kehoe and
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Cremer 1995). Predictor variables in the first stage that also
appeared in the second stage equation were: female, bachelor
degree, church attendance (model 1) and income, trust and
prosocial value orientation (model 2). The dummy variables
for age groups and current students were eliminated from the
selection equation because they were not significant. Because
identification of the Heckman Two Stage regression model
requires at least one variable in the selection stage that is not
included in the second stage (Smith, Kehoe and Cremer 1995),
a dummy variable was included for an experimental condition
randomly assigned to the respondents.
Results
An overwhelming majority of 1.852 subjects (94.3%)
kept the reward earned by participation in the GINPS for
themselves. Only 112 subjects (5.7%) decided to give away
the reward. The Queen Wilhelmina Cancer Fund received
63 donations (3.2%); the Me´decins Sans Frontie`res received
39 donations (2.0%) and the Aids Fund received 10 dona-
tions (0.5%). The result that only 5.7% chose to donate their
earnings is considerably less than the 10.4% in Eckel and
Grossman (1996) who donated their entire endowment in an
experiment among students with the Red Cross identified as
the sole recipient. While the results of the Eckel and Gross-
man (1996) experiment are not strictly comparable because
the participants were allowed to divide their endowment be-
tween themselves and the Red Cross, one would expect that
the participants who decided to donate their entire endowment
would also have donated their earnings in an all-or-nothing
version of the game.
As argued above, asset legitimacy, and anonymity of
decisions will have lowered generosity in the present study.
First, the present study used earnings instead of the customary
windfall endowment. Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002)
show that “legitimising” wealth by giving rewards to dictators
in proportion to the number of questions answered correctly
in a quiz strongly decreases generosity. While the participants
in the present study did not compete with each other, they did
earn the money they played with, which will have made them
feel entitled to keep their earnings.
Second, donation decisions were made anonymously,
which lowers generosity (Eckel and Grossman 1996). The
participants could not receive approval for donating from an
experimenter or the selected charity because the donation
decision was made through the Internet, without the presence
of an experimenter, and without receiving a “Thank you”
letter from or on behalf of the charities.
Third, the multivariate analysis (see column 1 of table 1)
reveals that the use of a random sample of the Dutch popula-
tion rather than a convenience sample of university students
has not decreased giving. Students are not more likely to
donate their earnings than non-students. However, in line
with studies of self-reported donations (Bekkers 2006; Brown
2005; Rooney et al. 2005), those holding a bachelor degree
or higher are more likely to make donations than those with
lower levels of education. Compared to the base rate of 5.2%,
the difference is substantial: those with a bachelor degree have
a 4.8% higher chance of donating the reward to charity than
those with lower levels of education. The fact that current
students are not more generous but university graduates are
indicates that the effect of education on charitable giving
becomes apparent only after graduation.
In model 2, where income, prosocial value orientation
and generalized social trust are included, the difference is
smaller (3.5%). This finding indicates that a higher level of
income, a more prosocial value orientation and a higher level
of trust are partly responsible for the higher likelihood of
donating earnings to charity among persons with a university
degree. Stepwise addition of trust, social value orientation,
and income reveals that income and trust contribute equally to
the relationship of education with donations, and that social
value orientation plays a minor role (results available upon re-
quest). The fact that a significant relationship with university
degree remains in model 2 suggests that there are still other
differences between those with a university degree and those
without such a degree that explain why university graduates
are more likely to donate their earnings. The more extensive
social networks of the higher educated may be an important
part of these differences (Brown 2005), or the higher verbal
ability of the higher educated (Bekkers 2006).
The validity of the game as a measure of altruistic be-
haviour can be evaluated with a comparison of observed dona-
tions in the game and self-reported donations to charitable or-
ganizations in the past year. Those who donated their rewards
in the game to charity reported higher donations to charity in
the past year (e376) than those who kept their reward (e237).
This difference is significant in an Anova (F=8.038, df=1, p<
.005). Thus, donations of earnings for survey participation to
charity resemble donations to charity at other occasions.
Further support for the validity of the game is found
in multivariate analyses of observed donations in the game
and self-reported philanthropy in the past year (see table 2).
Donations in the game are correlated with a similar set of
determinants as self-reported donations in the past year. In
both cases, donations increase with age, education, income,
prosocial value orientation and generalized social trust. The
increase of donations with age is in line with previous re-
search on charitable giving in the Netherlands (Bekkers 2006)
as well as in the US (Havens, O’Herlihy and Schervish 2006;
Rooney et al. 2005). The increase of generosity with proso-
cial value orientation is in line with results from laboratory
games (Buckley et al. 2001) and surveys (Bekkers 2006).
The increase of generosity with trust is in line with previous
research on charitable giving in the Netherlands (Bekkers
2003) as well as in the US (Uslaner 2002).
The frequency of church attendance is not correlated with
observed donations in the game. This finding seems to be at
odds with the well-known finding that religious involvement
is strongly related to philanthropy (Bekkers 2006; Havens,
O’Herlihy and Schervish 2006). Also in the present analysis,
the frequency of church attendance is strongly related to self-
reported donations in the past year. However, this finding is
not surprising since donations to religious organizations were
also included in the total amount donated. An other study
of donations in experimental games with secular charitable
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Table 1: Probit regression analysis of observed donations (source: GINPS, n=1.964; 339 censored)
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient se p Coefficient se p
Female (0-1)* -.020 .010 < 0.05 -.019 .010 < 0.05
Age 40-65 (0-1) .034 .013 < 0.01 .028 .012 < 0.05
Age 65 and over (0-1) .046 .020 < 0.01 .042 .019 < 0.05
University degree (0-1) .048 .014 < 0.001 .035 .013 < 0.01
Student (0-1) .013 .037 .026 .041
Church attendance -.000 .002 -.000 .002
Gross household income .020 .009 < 0.05
Prosocial value orientation .005 .002 < 0.05
Generalized social trust .018 .010 < 0.10
Stakes .008 .006 .004 .006
Predicted p .052 .050
Pseudo R-Square .034 .048
Log Likelihood -415.165 -408.897
Likelihood Ratio of Chi Square (df) 28.75 (8) < 0.001 41.28 (9) < 0.001
*(0-1) indicates variable is dichotomous
Table 2: Heckman Two Stage regression analysis of total amount donated (source: GINPS, n=1.964)
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient se p Coefficient se p
Female (0-1)* .022 .071 -.006 .066
Age 40-65 (0-1) .669 .075 < 0.001 .603 .074 < 0.001
Age 65 and over (0-1) 1.047 .099 < 0.001 1.023 .097 < 0.001
University degree (0-1) .471 .081 < 0.001 .408 .076 < 0.001
Student (0-1) -.158 .223 -.116 .220
Church attendance .029 .002 < 0.001 .032 .002 < 0.001
Gross household income .371 .062 < 0.001
Prosocial value orientation .059 .014 < 0.001
Generalized social trust .211 .084 < 0.05
Constant 3.936 .096 < 0.001 2.309 .271 < 0.001
Log Likelihood -3666.199 -3616.348
LR Chi Square (df) 466.84 (6) < 0.001 508.92 (9) < 0.001
LR independent equations 3.02 (1) < 0.10 0.01 (1)
*(0-1) indicates variable is dichotomous
organizations as recipients also failed to find correlations of
church attendance with giving in dictator games (Eckel and
Grossman 2004).
The lower generosity of women compared to men in the
dictator game is a somewhat odd finding. Previous laboratory
experiments with dictator games in the US reveal more gen-
erosity by females than males (Eckel and Grossman 1998).
In the analysis of the amount donated, however, females and
males do not differ significantly, as in other research (An-
dreoni, Brown and Rischall 2003; Havens, O’Herlihy, and
Schervish 2006). It is not clear what caused males to be
more generous than females in the dictator game. Perhaps the
vouchers offered as a reward for survey participation appealed
more to females than to males. The vouchers could be used at
a national chain of department stores selling domestic appli-
ances and cleaning products. The alternative reward of “Air
miles” are also a popular means to obtain domestic products.
The hypothesis that women are less likely to donate the reward
because the vouchers were more attractive to them than to
males can be tested in future research by paying the reward
for participation in the form of money instead of vouchers.
Finally, differences in stakes do not influence donation
decisions in the game. This result is in line with results of
previous laboratory studies (Carpenter, Verhoogen, and Burks
2005; Diekmann 2004).
Conclusion
Dictator games and charitable giving have been studied
by economists interested in the role of altruism in human
behavior (Andreoni 1990; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Ribar
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and Wilhelm 2002). The present field study among a random
sample of the Dutch population reinforces conclusions from
previous research that altruistic behavior is rather uncommon
when allocations are made anonymously of earned wealth
(Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren 2002), even when the re-
cipient is an (allegedly “deserving”) charity to be chosen by
participants. Ninety four percent of the allocations of earned
wealth in the present study are self-interested.
Combining the strengths of experimental games and
household surveys offers many advantages in the study of
altruistic behavior. Using a random sample of participants
allows generalizations beyond the population of university stu-
dents. It is comforting to know that students are equally likely
to donate as non-students. It seems that the level of generosity
observed in dictator game experiments is not systematically
biased when only university students participate.
The obvious advantage of random sampling is that socio-
demographic groups can be studied which would be difficult
to draw into the laboratory. Studies relying on students as
participants have often failed to detect relations of game be-
haviour with socio-demographic characteristics (Carpenter,
Verhoogen and Burks 2005). This is no surprise given the
relatively small variance in socio-demographic characteristics
among students (Harrison and List 2004:1018). The present
study showed that university graduates are more likely to do-
nate their earnings than those with lower levels of education,
in part because they earn higher incomes, because they have
more prosocial value orientations and because they are more
trusting. However, even controlling for income, social value
orientation and trust a positive effect of education remains.
Future research is needed to show which other factors make
higher educated persons more generous.
The larger number of participants in surveys enables ex-
perimental designs with a higher number of conditions than
lab experiments. While the present study did not include
any manipulations, the game can be modified easily to test
theories on motivations for altruistic behaviour. Future ex-
periments could manipulate features of the request itself (in-
cluding pictures of recipients, information on the impact of a
donation on recipients, contributions of others) and features
of the context in which the donation decision is made (e.g.,
before or after the interview, characteristics of the solicitor
like gender). The social context deserves special attention.
One would expect that reducing the level of anonymity of
decisions by participants increases the level of giving (Eckel
and Grossman 1996). Anonymity can be manipulated easily
in survey contexts. For instance, in personal interviews the
interviewer could solicit a contribution and collect responses
in more or less visible ways. This would make the decision
situation more realistic because the majority of donations are
made in response to direct solicitations (Bryant et al. 2003).
In online surveys, donations could be made public.
A limitation of the present study is that participants did
not have the option to split the reward between themselves
and a charity. The “split rewards” option is difficult to im-
plement in personal interviews, where participants are often
compensated with a voucher worth a fixed amount of money
(e.g., e10). To split the reward would require an action by the
interviewer, which would easily compromise the anonymity
of the respondents in their donation decisions. However, in
online surveys like the present study, an obvious extension
would be to allow a split of the reward between oneself and a
recipient.
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